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absent voter when the election official in the absentee's precinct is about to deposit the
mailed-in ballot in the ballot box. 2 6 Other statutes merely provide that the general
election laws which "are in their nature applicable shall apply to all transactions under
the act."27 This phrase may be construed as allowing the challenge provisions of the
general election law28 to apply to absent voters. But the court in the present case refused to make such a construction. Instead it held that the marking of the ballot by
the absent voter was equivalent to casting, and that after casting the vote could not
be challenged. 29 Furthermore, it argued that challenge could not be made after the
absentee had "offered to vote" by signing his application affidavit two to thirty days
before the election.3° The court was therefore in the anomalous position of saying
that the absent voter's qualifications are to be determined from two to thirty days before the election rather than at the date of the election. The court's construction of the
absent voter statute makes possible the argument that the act is unconstitutional because it makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification by giving only to the absent
voter the right to vote free from challenge of his qualifications on election day. A
preferable result would appear to be to allow the plaintiff to examine the absentees'
affidavits and challenge their qualifications as electors.31
Evidence-Constitutional Law-Validity of Act Requiring Attendance of NonResident Witnesses in Grand Jury Proceedings-[Pennsylvania].-The Attorney
General of the State of New York petitioned a Pennsylvania lower court for subpoenas ordering two residents of Pennsylvania to go into New York to testify before
a grand jury. The application was made under the provisions of a uniform act entitled
"an act providing for the securing of attendance of witnesses from without the state
in criminal cases."' The act is designed to enable the prosecuting authorities of a state
which has passed it to secure the attendance at either criminal or grand jury proceedings of witnesses who are within other states which have also adopted the act. In denying the subpoenas the court held, that the statute is unconstitutional because (i) it
26 Cal. Elec. Code (Deering, 1939) §§ 7842-7844; Ill. Rev. Stat. (i939) c. 46, § 471;
N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1922) c. 17, § 210(2); Mo. Rev. Stat. (Gillespie, Supp. 1937)
§ ioz8S.
27 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) § 25-1113.
28 Ibid., at §§ 25-407, 25-408, 25-411.
29 152 Kan. 826, 107 P. (2d) 773, 777-78 (1940). Cf. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 406
(entitled, 'ow ballot cast by absent voter."); Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 59, § 216
(introduced by the words, "In casting such absent voter's ballot ..... "); Neb. Comp. Stat.
(1929) §§ 32-805 (entitled, ".... . Ballot, How Cast."). Italics added.
30 152 Kan. 826, 107 P. (2d) 773, 778 (1940).
32In order to justify the result reached in the instant case, the court found it necessary to
strike from their opinion in Hansen v. Lindley, 152 Kan. 63, 102 P. (2d) io58 (I94o) the italicized words in the following passage which had already appeared in the advance sheets: "The
first opportunity a candidatehas to challenge a mailed-in vote, however, is when the board of canvassersis consideringit. Hence, there is no reason why the above section (Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, 1935) § 25-407) should not be a guide to the board of canvassers, to the contest court,
and on appeal to the district court and to this court." 152 Kan. 826, 107 P. (2d) 773, 779
(i94o). (Italics by the court.)
I Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. i94o) tit. i9, §§ 616-22, 9 Unif. L. Ann. 9 (Supp. i94o).
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does not meet the requirement of the Pennsylvania Constitution' that the title of a
statute must clearly state its content, since the title does not indicate that residents
of Pennsylvania may be compelled to testify in another state; (2) it violates the clause
of the Pennsylvania Constitution3 guaranteeing freedom from unreasonable seizures;
(3) it violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution; and (4) it deprives the witnesses of their liberty without due
process of law. Petition dismissed and subpoenas refused. In re the People of the State
of New York.4
In its earliest stages, the duty incumbent upon members of society to give testimony
applied only to witnesses for the Crown in criminal cases.5 Despite its later extension
to witnesses in civil proceedings and witnesses for the defense in criminal cases, the
duty remains one primarily due the state.6 It is a social obligation and exists even
though it may involve the sacrifice of time, labor, or privacy. Such sacrifice is regarded
as part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the public welfare, for testimony of witnesses is one of the instruments adopted by organized society to enforce
the law which gives every citizen the security and protection he enjoys.7 The duty of
the citizen to aid the law consists in appearance and testimony before either the petit
or grand jury and is enforced by citation for contempt.8 The demand upon the witness
does not come from any one person or the residents of any one community, but from
society as a whole.
It has long been recognized that the obligation of the witness is not limited to testimony to be used or given in a court of his own state.9 By virtue of the state legislation
or decision of court, he may be compelled to make a deposition for use in another
state, 0 and by a federal law of 1793 by which process runs throughout the country," a
witness for the prosecution in a criminal case can be compelled to attend proceedings
in any federal court, regardless of the district, and a witness in a civil case is required
2 Pa. Const. art. 3, § 3.
3Pa. Const. art. i, §8.
4Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County (Pa. Dec. 6, i94o).
s 8 Wigmore, Evidence 6o (3 d ed. 1940).
6 The dutyto testifyin civil proceedings first appeared in 5 Eliz., c. 9 (1563) when provision
was made for the service of process out of any court of record, requiring the person served to
testify concerning any matter pending in the court. If he refused, he was fined £io0 and forced
to pay damages to the party aggrieved. Prior to this date, except in criminal cases, witnesses
often had been regarded as unwelcome meddlers and were required to show an interest in the
cause or be denied the privilege of testifying. Not until the Restoration, however, was a
criminal defendant permitted to have the sworn testimony of any witness, as was the Crown
privileged. It was not until I Anne, c. 9, § 3 (1701) in cases of felonies that the criminal
defendant was guaranteed compulsory process and the correlative obligation to appear'and
testify devolved upon the witness for the defense as well as for the prosecution. 2 Bl. Comm.
* 369; 2 Watson, Constitution of the United States 1485 (1910).
7West v. State, I Wis. 186, 206 (853). See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919);
8 Wigmore, Evidence 66 (3d ed. 194o).
8 4 Bl. Comm. * 284; Rapalie, Contempt 74, 83 (1884).
9 Ex parte Taylor, no Tex. 331, 333, 220 S.W. 74, 75 (1920).
10 8 Wigmore, Evidence 94 (3d ed. i94o); 25 Harv. L. Rev. 188 (i911).
"i Stat. 335 (793), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 654-55 (1928).
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to travel as far as ioo miles. Indeed, the obligation upon the witness to aid in the enforcement of the criminal law demands that a United States citizen in a foreign country return home to testify when summoned through a consul.12
The need for the testimony of a non-resident witness has been heightened by the
advent of modern transportation and the resultant increase in the number of crimes involving the residents of more than one state either as participants or witnesses.
Presence of the former can be secured by extradition proceedings, but successful
prosecution very often depends upon the testimony of a non-resident witness who will
not voluntarily attend.x3 Because of the constitutional requirement that the defendant
in a criminal proceeding be allowed to "confront" the witnesses testifying against him,
depositions taken in the foreign state will not suffice. Even without any constitutional
objection, they would not be as desirable as viva voce testimony given before the
forum.14 The desirability of such evidence and the need for it in the execution of the
laws of the state is exhibited by the adoption of the uniform act by thirty-four states.s
As a necessary adjunct to the proper administration of the criminal law of the state,
it would seem that the uniform act is but an extension of the duty to the state to give
testimony. The inadequacy of the title of the statute is a defect which can easily be
rectified by amendment. 6 The other constitutional objections, however, if valid, are
not so easily remedied.
The court felt that the provisions of the statute "for taking a witness into custody
and delivering him bodily to authorities for a foreign jurisdiction" was so "unreasonable and unwarranted" as to be violative of the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution that "the people shall be secure in their persons .... from unreasonable
....
seizures ..... " The constitutional guarantee, however, does not prevent the
Stat. 835

U.S.C.A. §§ 711-18 (Supp. 194o); Blackmer v. United States,
U.S. 421 (1932).
'3 Dean, Interstate Compacts for Crime Control in Proceedings of the Attorney General's
Conference on Crime 64 (1934); Medalie, Interstate Exchange of Witnesses in Criminal
Cases, 7 Panel, No. 2, at i (March, 1929). Congress has made it a criminal offense to leave
the state to avoid testifying in criminal proceedings. 48 Stat. 782 (1934), i8 U.S.C.A. § 480e
(Supp. 194o); United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (Ky. 1936).
'4 See 5 Wigmore, Evidence 127, 143 (3 d ed. 194o).
xs 9 Unif. L. Ann. 9 (Supp. i94o).
The compulsory attendance of non-resident witnesses has been advocated for international
use as well as for domestic use. Communication of Judicial and Extra-Judicial acts in Penal
Matters and Letters Rogatory in Penal Matters, 22 Am. J. of Int'l L. 46, 66 (special number,
1928). Wisconsin has a reciprocal statute similar to the uniform act for use in civil cases. Wis.
Stat. (ig3) § 326.25.
16The uniform act, as enacted in New Jersey, was declared unconstitutional for the same
reason. New York v. Parker, 16 N.J. Misc. 471 (Cir. Ct. 1936). But, the title of the act was
amended, for it now reads, "Compelling appearance of resident witnesses in criminal prosecutions in other states and non-resident witnesses in criminal prosecutions in this state." N.J.
Rev. Stat. (i937) tit. 2, c. 97, §§ 2:97-19 to 26. The validityof an earlier NewYork statute, very
similar to the uniform act, has been contested twice. In a cursory opinion in In re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 90 N.Y. Supp. 8o8 (S. Ct. i9o4), the act was held unconstitutional as a denial of due process. In a more fully considered opinion in Massachusetts
v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 13o N.Y. Supp. 713 (1gi), the statute was sustained, Laughlin,
J., dissenting.
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issuance of process to require the attendance of witnesses within the state.? It is
therefore difficult to see why it should invalidate the provision of the uniform act. The
activities condemned as "unreasonable searches and seizures" are usually those which
compel a person to give evidence against himself.'8 Compulsory testimony which, when
given before a court which has jurisdiction of the witness, is not for any reason an "unreasonable search and seizure" should not be deemed such when the witness is compelled to testify outside the state.
Another ground assigned for the invalidity of the statute is the violation of the right
to free ingress and egress to and from the several states guaranteed by the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.'9
The witness is made to leave the state against his will and to go into another state
when he does not wish to. His privilege of going into any other state he desires is denied
him. If compulsory egress in the interest of the administration of justice does deny the
witness free egress and ingress into the state of his choice, it nevertheless is not an unjustifiable restraint. Every citizen attending a trial within the state is, to the same
extent, temporarily deprived of his right to leave the state at his will. The right of
free egress is suspended in favor of the paramount obligation of the individual to contribute to the administration of justice.
The last objection made is that the act deprives the witness of his liberty without
due process of law. The witness here, however, is afforded the protection of due process
to a greater extent than he would be if he were forced to testify within the state.'0
He is given an opportunity to be heard as to the materiality of his testimony and as
to his objections to the compulsory order before the subpoena issues. He will be compelled to attend only if it will not cause undue hardship and if the laws of the state in
which the prosecution or inquiry is pending and the states through which he must pass
in traveling will protect him from service of civil or criminal process. Finally, he is
fully reimbursedl and need travel no more than iooo miles.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admssibility of Docket of Justice of Peace-[Idaho].-The
defendant was charged with violating an Idaho statute' by writing a check with intent
to defraud. At the hearing before a justice of the peace, the defendant admitted writing the check. The justice thereupon entered a plea of guilty and sentenced the defendant to ninety days in jail. Upon appeal to the district court under a statute' au17Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1gI).
iBoyd v. United States, i6 U.S. 616, 633 (1886); Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law 743,
746 (1939).
'9 William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (I9OO); Slaughter-House Cases, i6 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 75
(1872); see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 521 n. 1 (1938); cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall.
(U.S.) 35 (r867). Lien, Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States 8o (i9x3).
20Cf. Rest., Conflict of Laws §94 (1934); 4 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence § 1437 (4 th ed.
1919).
21Compare the ten cents per mile and five dollars a day provided by the uniform act with
the five cents per mile and one dollar a day provided for witnesses within the state by Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 53, § 65.
'Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § i7-39o8.
2Ibid.,
§ i9-4o42.

